ABSTRACT
Introduction
NATO peacekeeping troops have been in Kosovo since June 1999. They have divided the province into five MultiNational Brigade areas led by the French (in the North), the British (Central), the American (East), the German (South) and the Italian (West) (Figure 1 ). Considerable tension remains between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, with Albanian extremists intimidating Serbs remaining in Kosovo.
The Incident
A convoy of "Nis Express" coaches regularly transports Serbian civilians between Nis in Serbia and a pilgrimage site in Gracanica in Kosovo, escorted by KFOR armoured cars.
At 1112 hrs on Friday 16 February 2001, a 200+kg high explosive bomb was detonated in a culvert under the front of the first coach of a convoy 800 metres south of Gate 3 at the Kosovo -Serbia border, north of Podujevo in the area of responsibility of the Second Royal Tank Regiment (2RTR) Battlegroup. The coach was blown upwards by the blast, but its momentum carried it onwards until it halted abruptly on the road 18 metres beyond the crater (Figure 2 ). The coach contained about 56 adults and children. The driver and nine passengers in the front three rows of seats were killed instantaneously, their bodies being ejected up to 100 metres away. 21 other passengers were injured. It has been impossible to determine whether any others subsequently presented directly to Serbian hospitals.
(consultant and registrar), and a consultant physician. Further staff included a General Duties Medical Officer (GDMO), a radiographer, a laboratory technician, four HQ staff, 14 nurses and Health Care Assistants (HCAs), and six Combat Medical Technicians (Cbt Med Techs). The Emergency Department (A&E) had three resuscitation bays. There was a 13-bed ward, a 2-bed intensive care unit and two operating theatres. A 10-bed ward was reserved as a Priority Two (P2) area for major incidents.
Aeromedical assets:
The MNB(C) Joint Helicopter Force, at Pristina airport, consisted of two Royal Air Force Pumas and a Gazelle. One Puma was always on 30 minutes standby as part of the Incident Response Team (IRT). The IRT was under direct control of HQ MNB(C). It provided an Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and medical response to incidents in the Brigade area of operations. The medical element consisted of an anaesthetist and an operating department practitioner from Reynolds Hospital.
Other Secondary Care Assets
American (Bondsteel Hospital): The 36-bed Hospital Surgical Unit at Camp Bondsteel, manned mainly by US Army Reserves from the 313th Hospital Unit Surgical, was the Role 3 medical facility for Multi-National Brigade (East) (MNB(E)). The hospital had 140 staff, which included two general surgeons and one orthopaedic surgeon. It had the only CT scanner for KFOR troops, and four dedicated aeromedical evacuation UH60 Blackhawk helicopters from the 236th Medical Company (Air Ambulance). Other KFOR hospitals: There was a Russian 30-bed hospital in Kosovo Polje in MNB(C), a French 25-bed hospital in Mitrovica in MNB(N), an Italian 50-bed hospital in Pec in MNB(S), and a German 60-bed facility in Prizren in MNB(W). Serbian: There was a 650-bed General Hospital in Mitrovica, in the Serbian area in northern Kosovo.
The
Emergency Services Response to the Incident (Table 1) Priorities at the scene -MIMMS guidelines (1-3) C -Command & Control S -Safety (oneself, the scene, the casualties) C -Communications A -Assessment (using METHANE acronym) T -Triage T -Treatment T -Transport 
C -Communications
Communication from the scene was by radio to Brigade HQ, or directly by ambulance radio to the Med Sqn Ops Room, which relayed messages to A&E. HQ MNB(C) also despatched its Gazelle to the scene. This provided a communications relay service between ground and air radio nets.
A -Assessment
The Cbt Med Tech Cpl commanding the first ambulance sent his scene assessment to Med Branch at HQ MNB(C), using the METHANE formula (see Box 1). This message, and similar ones from the police and battlegroup incident officers, confirmed the nature of the incident and initiated the Brigade Major Incident Response. 
T -Triage

S -Safety
After the explosion the immediate concern was that the convoy might come under further attack, so the armoured cars took up defensive positions covering the coaches. Further action was directed to swiftly extricate casualties from the coach. In the initial chaos some survivors ran into surrounding fields, not thinking that they might have been mined. KFOR troops rapidly established a semblance of order. They loaded uninjured survivors and most of the walking wounded onto the other coaches, directing them to the safety of the border crossing. A helicopter landing site was established on the road about 100m south from the coach. On arrival the EOD team started searching for secondary devices.
The RMO performed a needle thoracocentesis to relieve tension pneumothorax in a critically ill patient (Patient 1). The patient regained consciousness and was evacuated on the first helicopter to Reynolds. The RMO had no facilities for formal chest drainage. The IRT Puma arrived just as the first Puma was leaving with four casualties. The RMO briefed the medical team and SMO, who then helped treat the remaining four P2 and six P3 casualties.
T -Transport
"Get the right patient to the right place in the right time -Do not transfer the major incident from the scene to the hospital" Once the scale of the incident became clear, HQ MNB(C) requested assistance from HQ MNB(E), which deployed three Blackhawks to the border crossing to collect seven walking wounded, and activated the Major Incident Plan at Bondsteel. The two Pumas rapidly loaded casualties according to triage priority and transported them in a shuttle service to hospital.The first three flights went to Reynolds (10 minutes flying time away) and the fourth went to Bondsteel (20 minutes flying time). Med Branch at HQ attempted not to overburden Reynolds, obtaining confirmation that more casualties could be accommodated before sending the second and third flights there. Three patients left the scene by ambulance. The last patient (Patient 14) left the scene 1h 40 mins after the explosion, on the 4th flight. As she had a fractured femur, the presence of an orthopaedic surgeon at Bondsteel determined her destination. 13 patients were initially transported to Reynolds and 8 to Bondsteel. (Table 2) Both hospitals' Major Incident Plans incorporated dual clinical and administrative command and control. At Reynolds, where there was only one general surgeon, it had been decided surgery would not be performed during reception of mass casualties unless deemed absolutely necessary to save life. The general surgeon would act as clinical co-ordinator and triage officer.
Casualty Management at Hospital
Triage
Reynolds. The first casualties arrived at 1210hrs, one hour after the explosion. The only information received beforehand was that 4xP1 casualties were en route. They were re-triaged as 3xP1 and 1xP2.
P1 casualties were directed to the three Resus Bays, P2 casualties to the P2 ward, and P3 casualties to the physiotherapy tent. A casualty board with essential demographic details, mass casualty number, triage categories and diagnoses, and destination in the hospital, was maintained in the triage area. The 13 casualties arrived within the space of 70 minutes. 3 were triaged as P1, 4 as P2, and 6 as P3. Bondsteel. The first casualty (patient 14) arrived at 1310 hrs. A senior NCO performed triage at the entrance to the Emergency Medical Treatments tent. Urgent (P2) casualties were directed to trauma stations in the Resuscitation area, whilst Delayed (P3) casualties were directed to the sick call waiting area. There were no Immediate (P1) casualties.
Treatment
Reynolds: Trauma teams of doctors, nurses, and combat medical technicians were assigned to each P1 patient. The consultant anaesthetist, maxillofacial surgeon, GDMO, and an RMO from the adjacent Primary Health Care Centre were assigned to this area. Three additional RMOs arrived and were assigned to the P2 area. Teams of one nurse and one HCA staffed each P2 bed, with treatment supervised by the consultant physician. The dentist, physiotherapist and a HCA treated P3 casualties until a RMO and nurse became available. All patients with penetrating trauma received tetanus toxoid booster and benzylpenicillin. 
Transfusion requirements
Reynolds. 44 units of blood were initially requested. As only 29 units were in stock, 15 units were flown over from Bondsteel. A nurse and HCA ran the emergency blood donor session, collecting 10 fresh units from carefully screened British Army volunteers from the adjacent camp. The donated blood underwent ABO and Rh D grouping, and screening for atypical serologic antibodies, HIV 1 and 2, and syphilis. Three of these units were transfused into Patient 2. Remaining donated blood was destroyed
Forensic Investigation
Once all wounded had left, UNMIK police and a UN forensic pathologist carried out a full forensic investigation of the site. The appropriately labelled human remains were then taken to a temporary body holding facility (a refrigerated container) at Reynolds.
The UN pathologist performed the initial forensic examination in a temporary morgue at Reynolds.Three forensic pathologists from Belgrade arrived on the third day and completed the post-mortem examination, recording findings in the internationally accepted Interpol Disaster Victim Identification forms. Only one body was intact. Moderate bodily fragmentation had occurred in 6 victims, and gross fragmentation in 3 others. There was a preponderance of lower limb trauma, including several traumatic amputations through mid-tibia and mid-femur. There were no amputations through joints. Severe head destruction had occurred in 5 cases. It was impossible to match all body parts, therefore raising the possibility that there might be more than 10 victims, so two equivalent sets of samples were taken for DNA analysis from each body except the intact one. UNMIK police retained one set, and the other was taken to Belgrade. It took the 4 pathologists 6 days to identify 9 of the 10 victims. No next-of-kin presented to identify the 10th body. The dead comprised 3 females (age range 20 to 29 years) and 7 males (age range 2 to 62 years), including one family group (husband, wife and son).
Discussion
A major incident for the medical services is defined as a situation where extraordinary medical arrangements have to be made to cope with the number, severity, type or location of live casualties (1). The "Nis Express" coach bombing was such an incident.
A: Preparation i. Education: This focuses on two aspects:
• management -through courses such as
MIMMS and HMIMMS (Major Incident Medical Management and Support: the practical approach at the scene/at the Hospital);
• treatment -through courses such as ATLS®, BATLS/BARTS (4), and DSTS (Definitive Surgical Trauma Skills) (5) (6) , and relevant textbooks (7) (8) .
The MIMMS courses in particular, with their CSCATTT framework, provide a structured, internationally accepted approach to the major incident scene (the medical management) and to dealing with multiple casualties (support) (1-3) . MIMMS has been the UK Defence Medical Services standard since 1996 and NATO doctrine since 2003, its principles had been actively promulgated in Kosovo, and it underpinned the management of this incident.
ii. Planning. The advance formulation of a major incident plan is crucial for successful management of a major incident (9-10). The Reynolds Hospital Major Incident plan was based on a generic format designed by the DMS Specialty Adviser in Accident & Emergency Medicine.
iii. Exercise. Every medical unit should regularly exercise communications, clinical co-ordination, triage, treatment of various injuries in different settings, trauma documentation, and interservice working arrangements. The value of exercise was well illustrated by Bondsteel, which had just held a mass casualty exercise with 30 casualty simulation patients. The lessons identified were successfully implemented during this incident.
B: Management at the scene Safety
Medical and other rescue personnel are at high risk of secondary devices in terrorist incidents (11) . It was fortunate that no such devices were placed around the scene, as these would have caused many more casualties, both KFOR and civilian.
"Scoop and run"
The use of aeromedical helicopters to speedily retrieve casualties has been fundamental to military medical planning since the Korean War (12) . Treatment at the scene concentrated on life-saving measures, Preparation for a major incident involves education, planning, and exercise.
care being taken not to delay helicopter evacuation.
The Incident Response Team
The composition of the IRT in Kosovo resembled that in Bosnia (13). In a major incident in Kosovo the local RMO (usually a junior doctor) normally acted as Medical Incident Officer. In Bosnia an experienced SMO deploys with the IRT as Medical Incident Officer, enabling the anaesthetist to concentrate on treatment and transport of the critically ill, and to return speedily to hospital. This is a better use of specialists' expertise.
C: Management At Hospital
Reception and definitive care There are two phases in the hospital management of casualties in a major incident (2, 14) . The reception phase is while the incident is evolving, casualties are arriving, and the scale of the incident is unknown.The priority here is to conserve key resources and facilities for a yet-unknown number of critically injured patients by providing minimal acceptable care to all others. The difficulty lies in defining minimal acceptable care -for instance, how long can one safely delay laparotomy for ruptured spleen? This was the dilemma faced at Reynolds. Damage control surgery applies the principles of minimal acceptable care to save the lives of the most critically injured patients. It is particularly applicable in a military setting and in major incidents (8, (15) (16) (17) . The definitive care phase occurs after all casualties have arrived, their injuries have been defined, and hospital resources are fully mobilised. Definitive care can now be provided according to triage priorities.
The Role Of Physicians
In addition to supervising the care of P2 casualties and resuscitating a critically injured patient, the consultant physician took over as clinical co-ordinator once surgery started. The next day he took an active part in the combined ward round with two local doctors. This illustrated the potential for military physicians to be more actively involved in clinical co-ordination and major incident management. abdominal bleeding, confirmed at laparotomy. Conservative management of splenic rupture is not feasible in a major incident or field surgical conditions. Diagnostic peritoneal lavage was not performed in any patient, with ultrasound being the investigation of choice. This is standard British military practice for blunt abdominal trauma, corroborated by civilian practice (18) (19) (20) and extensive Israeli experience (10).The high incidence of splenic trauma in this and other explosions (21) illustrates the need for vigilance.
Blood Transfusion
Patients 1 and 2 were the only patients to receive blood at Reynolds. Experience elsewhere has shown most injuries (apart from amputations) do not need transfusion, with the transfusion trigger safely being lowered to a haematocrit of 21% (Hb 70g/L) (22) . A field hospital has limited bloodbank resources and no platelets.
Whole blood therapy is exceptionally rare in the developed world, but remains of critical importance in austere environments (22) (23) .
Freshly donated warm blood, with its full complement of platelets, can be lifesaving.
Transfer To Definitive Care
The total time from the explosion to evacuation of the last patient from Reynolds was 29 hours 50 minutes.This time is similar to other incidents. 28 hours 15 minutes elapsed between a Hip helicopter crash in Bosnia and the last patient leaving Hospital Squadron Sipovo for Prague (24) . It took almost 29 hours from the first soldiers being wounded in the British hostage rescue operation in Sierra Leone (OP BARRAS) (25) to the last patient leaving RFA SIR PERCIVALE for the UK (Vassallo DJ, unpublished data). This speedy evacuation reflects the military necessity to restore the ability of the medical unit to accept further mass casualties as soon as possible, and the clinical need for further definitive care of ITU patients. The "30 hour / next-day rule" is a useful guide to the time a field hospital may have to manage mass casualties prior to evacuation in operations other than war.
D: The wider picture
This unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians caused international outrage (26) and was condemned by the UN Security Council (27). The active involvement of the forensic team from Belgrade (28) and its close cooperation with UN police and NATO troops helped defuse the political tension. This was the first time forensic experts from the
An emergency blood donor panel should be set up at the start of all operational deployments.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had participated in UN investigations in Kosovo.
E: Mechanism of injuries
All those who died had been ejected from the coach. The survivors, all seated further back, were not in the direct path of the blast and none of them was ejected. Injuries were caused by blast effects and decelerational forces.
Blast injuries were identifiable (29) (30) as:
i. Primary injuries (due to interaction of the blast wave with the body, primarily affecting gas-filled structures such as ears, lungs and gastrointestinal tract). The tension pneumothorax in Patient 1, unaccompanied by rib fractures or penetrating trauma, is characteristic of severe primary blast injury (21, 31) , and indicated the need for early evacuation to definitive ITU care.
ii. Secondary injuries (penetrating and blunt trauma caused by energised fragments impacting on casualties). The bodily disruption of the dead and the wounds in Patients 2 and 4 were consistent with this mechanism.
iii. Tertiary injuries (due to displacement of the body or its limbs by the blast wind). This mechanism accounted for the traumatic amputations.
iv. Quaternary injuries. Two of the dead had severe leg burns; many survivors had corneal abrasions and facial flash burns.
Decelerational injuries
The complex decelerational forces arising in this incident were analogous to those in survivable helicopter crashes (32) (33) .
Horizontal deceleration forces (generated by sudden forward movement when the coach impacted with the ground, followed by abrupt cessation of movement when the unrestrained casualties impacted on seat backs) predispose to head, cervical and upper thoracic injuries (seen in Patients 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 17, 18 and 21) .
Vertical deceleration forces (generated when the coach abruptly upended and then dropped to the ground) predispose to thoraco-lumbar fractures in upright, seated occupants (seen in Patients 8, 15 and 19) , and probably caused the pelvic fractures in Patients 1,3 and 9.
Traumatic amputations
The severity of injuries in the dead who had traumatic amputations and the lack of amputations in survivors reinforces evidence from other explosions (9, 29, 34) that casualties close enough to an explosion to suffer amputation are unlikely to survive the blast wave. Conversely, survivors from explosions are highly unlikely to have traumatic amputations, and if they have amputations they will usually have other critical injuries, with at least 10% chance of dying (9) .
F: Where can we do better?
An uncorroborated report from Serbia on 10 April indicated one patient died after transfer. If so, was this death preventable?
The management of the four most severely injured patients (ISS > 15) in this major incident was compared against 32 predetermined standards of care for individual trauma cases ('performance indicators'), previously used at MDHU Frimley Park Hospital and 22 Field Hospital in Kosovo in 1999 (35-36) . Areas of concern were: • Pre-hospital care. There was no prehospital triage labelling or documentation of casualties. Casualties arrived at hospital with no record of their vital signs or of their treatment at the scene. All Role 1 operational units should be equipped with the approved DMS triage cards. These have NATO Stock Numbers for packs of 5 cards (for individuals) and 20 cards (for operational ambulances).
• Resuscitation. There was a significant delay in surgical resuscitation of Patient 2. Some delay is inevitable in a major incident, but lack of communication with the scene caused unnecessary delay in instituting definitive care when she was still non-critical.
• Definitive care. Patient 2's core temperature had dropped below 32C before the operation was terminated. Surgical and anaesthetic staff should remain alert to the danger of patients entering the "bloody vicious cycle" of profound hypothermia, coagulopathy and metabolic acidosis.
• Documentation. P1 casualties had their treatment at least partially documented on Tudor ® Trauma charts. Most P2 and P3 patients were poorly documented. Standardised trauma charts should be used for all P1 and P2 casualties in field hospitals. Clinicians must pay more attention to the supervision and completion of documentation.
Communications
Communications have consistently been identified as the major failing in major incidents (1) . This incident might even have been prevented were it not for "a failure in basic communication" (37) Between scene and hospital. The critical failing was that the medical incident officer could not communicate directly with either hospital. It is essential for the hospital clinical co-ordinator to receive timely information, such as a patient requiring urgent chest drainage is en route by helicopter. He also needs to know the approximate number and nature of casualties and their probable time of arrival in order to make best use of key resources during this reception phase (2,14,17,38 ).
It is equally important to know no more casualties are expected, so definitive care can commence. The clinical co-ordinator at Reynolds did not know the scene had been cleared of casualties until the IRT anaesthetist returned 65 minutes after the last casualty left the scene. This seriously delayed surgery on Patient 2.
Between military and civilian medical services. There was excellent co-operation between Serbian and KFOR medical personnel during this incident. There had been limited contact beforehand, and this delayed the transfer of patients. Transfer was finally initiated when a local doctor used his mobile telephone from Reynolds to contact a colleague in Mitrovica. The need for combined civilian and military major incident planning is not always appreciated on operations, or even in the UK (39) .
Conclusion
This incident has been analysed in detail to augment the "institutional military medical memory" that is so much at risk with the closure of the UK's military hospitals and the dispersal of military clinicians into civilian practice (40) .
It was successfully managed using the MIMMS approach and BATLS protocols. 
